

## EUBOEA IN THE TIME OF PHILIP II<sup>1</sup>

### I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

To the modern student of fourth-century Greece nothing at first sight seems so surprising as the almost kaleidoscopic changes in relations between Greek cities, especially in the fourth century. Mortal enemies become allies suddenly, and alliances, though made for all time, are rapidly dissolved. In his old age Sophocles had summed up the harsh experience of a lifetime in words that might serve as an epigraph for the mutability of Greek 'international' politics.<sup>2</sup>

φθίνει μὲν ἰσχύς γῆς, φθίνει δὲ σώματος,  
θνήσκει δὲ πίστις, βλαστάνει δ' ἀπιστία,  
καὶ πνεῦμα ταῦτόν οὔ ποτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἀνδράσιν  
φίλοις βέβηκεν οὔτε πρὸς πόλιν πόλει.  
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἤδη, τοῖς δ' ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ  
τὰ τερπνὰ πικρὰ γίνεταί καθ' οἷς φίλα.

He applied these words to the relations between Athens and Thebes, and this application was more clearly verified after his death; hostile from 431 to 404, the cities were allies in perpetuity from 395 to 386, and again from 378 to 371, and then at war or on bad terms until they united at the last hour against Philip in 339. Of the general instability of relations between Greek cities Demosthenes remarked that no one in his senses would trust a friend so far as to renounce the means of self-defence, if that friend should seek to do him an injury, or hate an enemy so much as to bar him from seeking to become a friend.<sup>3</sup>

Explanations of this instability are not hard to find. *First*, *stasis* was endemic; it was common, as in the Peloponnesian war, for one party or both to call in aid from foreign powers; a revolution within a city might transform its foreign relations.<sup>4</sup> In the fourth century Athens' treaties frequently included reciprocal guarantees not only against external attack but also against revolutions within.<sup>5</sup> Party strife had now become more prevalent, if not more bitter. In Thucydides' day Athens had been sufficiently strong to maintain democracies among most, though not all, of her subjects, and Sparta to support oligarchies in her league. But in the fourth century Athens never recovered her old power, and Sparta's control in the Peloponnese was broken by Leuctra, with fearful effects which Isocrates hardly exaggerates in the *Archidamus*.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I cite the following works by the author's name: K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*<sup>2</sup>; U. Kahrstedt, *Forsch. zur Gesch. des ausgehenden fünften u. des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1910); A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes u. seine Zeit*<sup>2</sup> (reprint, 1966); F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonen u. Griechenland* (München, 1938); F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der gr. Hist.*, from which I cite Philochorus. D. = Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes) and A. = Aeschines. See also p. 247 n. 1. I am indebted for various helpful comments to Mr. G. T. Griffith.

<sup>2</sup> *Oed. Col.* 610-15; cf., for individuals, *Ajax* 677-83.

<sup>3</sup> D. 23. 122; cf. Arist. *EN* 1156<sup>a</sup>6 ff. on friendships contracted διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον.

<sup>4</sup> Thuc. 3. 82.

<sup>5</sup> Tod 127; 144; 147 (cf. 156).

<sup>6</sup> Isocr. 6. 64-8; cf. Diod. 15. 40 (various Peloponnesian cities); 58 with Plut. 814 B (Argos); Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 41-3 (cf. Diod. 15. 77); 7. 4. 17 and 28-30; 7. 5. 1 and 18 (Achaëa); 7. 1. 44-6 (cf. Diod. 15. 70); 7. 2. 11-15; 7. 3. 1 ff. (Sicyon); Plut. *Timol.* 4-7; Nepos, *Timol.* 1; Diod. 16. 65; Arist. *Pol.* 1306<sup>a</sup>24 (Corinth); Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 5-10; 7. 4. 33 ff. (Arcadia); for Elis p. 259, n. 3, and p. 262 n. 8.

Internal treason became a standard method of taking fortified towns.<sup>1</sup> The recipes that Aristotle recommends to tyrants, oligarchies, and democracies for maintaining themselves in power<sup>2</sup> might suggest that the evils of constant revolutions were so great that he would have preferred to see any stable regime, even though its form of government was by ideal standards perverted. The enormity of the misery caused by *stasis* is shown by the number of political refugees; when Alexander had the restoration of exiles proclaimed at Olympia, 20,000 are said to have assembled there alone to hear it read.<sup>3</sup>

It is, therefore, tempting to suppose that mutations in the foreign policy of a city are due to the seizure of power by a new party, which looks to a foreign state to maintain its supremacy and which is concerned only with its own selfish interests. We label politicians as pro-Athenian, pro-Theban, pro-Macedonian, and so forth. It is also easy to assume that sheer bribery often determined their conduct. Philip is said to have boasted of his ability to take cities with his money-bags.<sup>4</sup> At Athens itself corruption was continually alleged against politicians. Demosthenes was always inveighing against the mercenary traitors who both at Athens and elsewhere sacrificed the liberties of Greece to Philip for their own enrichment. Yet in the view of Polybius, himself a Megalopolitan, the Arcadian and Messenian politicians whom Demosthenes accused of treason, because they made their cities allies of Philip, had 'by bringing Philip into the Peloponnese and humbling the Spartans enabled their peoples to breathe again and conceive the idea of freedom'; they had enlarged their cities' territories; and they had not admitted Macedonian garrisons or deprived their peoples of their liberties for the sake of their own advantage and power; they simply did not equate the interests of their own cities, as Demosthenes did, with the interests of Athens.<sup>5</sup>

Polybius' observations suggest a *second* explanation for the mutability of inter-state relations. Each city was passionately attached to its own independence, to the maintenance of its territorial integrity, and, where opportunity occurred, to the extension of its dominion or influence. If a city contracted an alliance, it was not necessarily because a party was in power which depended for the continuance of that power on the backing of the ally, or which was receiving bribes or subsidies from that ally; it might be that the alliance subserved those interests which local patriots sincerely believed to be the city's interests. These alliances were friendships made for self-advantage and, therefore, easily dissolved, as circumstances changed.<sup>6</sup> The great powers of Greece, Sparta, Athens, and Thebes continued to cherish imperialistic ambitions. Even cities of the second order like Elis and Mantinea sought to control smaller neighbours.<sup>7</sup> Less powerful communities, threatened now by one of the great powers and now by another, were always ready to enter a new

<sup>1</sup> Aeneas Tacticus 1. 6-7; 3. 3; 10. 5-6; 10. 15; 10. 20; 10. 25; 11. 14; 17; 22. 6-7; 22. 15-17; 23. 6-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Pol.* 5. 9; 6. 3; 6. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. 18. 8. 5. Such refugees probably provided many of the mercenaries, whose number was for Isocrates one of the great evils of his day, e.g. 8. 24 and 44-8; *ep.* 9. 8-10; note *apolides* in 8. 44. By 323 the total may have been swollen by banishment of anti-Macedonians.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 16. 54. Cf. Cawkwell, *C.Q.* xiii (1963), 204 with prudent reserves. Philip's diplomacy (Polyaenus 4. 2. 9) was perhaps more important, playing on the divisions between cities.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. 18. 14; compare, on Thessaly, 9. 33, against 9. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *EN* 1157<sup>a</sup>25 ff., classes all friendships between cities as made for self-interest.

<sup>7</sup> Brunt, *Phoenix* xix (1965), 256-7.

combination that seemed to afford them protection for the time. When one great power was menacing, they looked for help to a rival; as that rival grew dangerously in strength, often precisely because it had secured many such alliances, they were ready to return to the other side. Such cities were not necessarily pro-Athenian or pro-Macedonian, because they allied with Athens or Macedon: they were for themselves alone.

The oscillations of the Euboean cities in the mid-fourth century well illustrate these features of Greek political experience, which cannot be correctly interpreted without careful regard to the aims of small as well as large cities. They are worth reviewing once more, if (as I believe) the most recent treatment, by Mr. G. L. Cawkwell, does not bring out fully the significance of Euboean conduct, besides obscuring the sequence of events in 342-1. Despite the criticisms I shall make of his articles,<sup>1</sup> I must also stress that on many points I am heavily indebted to them.

## II. EVENTS FROM 357 TO 348 B.C.

After Leuctra the Euboeans deserted the Athenian league for the Theban alliance, perhaps because it placed them under looser and less onerous obligations; no reason is recorded.<sup>2</sup> Euboeans were with Epaminondas in his campaigns of 370/69 and of 362.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime a tyrant named Themison had gained power at Eretria. In 366 he seized Oropus from Athens; the Thebans assisted him to defend the place, and kept it for themselves.<sup>4</sup> Relations between Thebes and Themison may have deteriorated as a result.

Diodorus tells us that in 357 there was *stasis* in Euboea; one party called in the Athenians, the other the Thebans. After initial successes the Thebans were defeated. Though no great battle was fought, he alleges that the island was ruined and that casualties were high; eventually internal harmony was restored. This brief account is very inadequate. Given the military superiority of the Thebans, their defeat is surprising. It has been suggested to me that they were already preoccupied by the prospect of war with Phocis, but as this did not begin until summer 356, and as even then Thebes did not act promptly and powerfully to suppress Philomelus before he could recruit a large mercenary force, this seem unlikely.<sup>5</sup> The Athenian victory was more

<sup>1</sup> *C. Q.* xii (1962), 127-30 = Cawkwell i; *ibid.* xiii (1963), 120 ff.; 200 ff. = Cawkwell ii.

<sup>2</sup> As members of the Athenian league, they had surrendered part of their sovereignty, for they were bound by the decisions taken jointly by Athens and a majority of the *syndrion*. It also appears from A. 3. 94 ff. (below) that each of the four large Euboean cities, Carystus, Chalcis, Eretria, and Oreus had to pay a *syntaxis* of 5 talents to the league. *Syntaxis* were still collected after 371, when the war with Sparta ended, for which the league had been formed. Perhaps the Euboeans did not secede immediately after Leuctra, but only when they found that the peace had not freed them from their obligations. Moreover, the little towns of Athenai Diades and Dium were

inscribed among the members of the Athenian league (Tod 123, vv. 88 and 90); they later disappear, and Oreus may have seized the occasion to swallow them up, once the Euboeans were no longer in the league. (On the putative membership of Arethusa near Chalcis see S. Accame, *La Lega Ateniese* (Rome, 1940), p. 72.)

<sup>3</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 6. 5. 23; 7. 5. 4. *IG* xii. 7. 7, recording loans to Carystus from Thebans and Oreans, seems to belong to this time.

<sup>4</sup> *Diod.* 15. 76. 1; A. 3. 85. *Xen. Hell.* 7. 4. 1 is silent on Themison's role.

<sup>5</sup> *Diod.* 16. 7. 2. On the chronology of the Sacred war see N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* lvii (1957), 58 ff.; J. Pouilloux, *BCH* lxxiii (1949), 177 ff.

complete than Diodorus makes plain; inscriptions show that the Euboeans rejoined the Athenian league.<sup>1</sup> It was achieved, according to Aeschines, within a month.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans could hardly have been so completely and quickly beaten unless virtually the whole country had been against them. They presumably saw that in a guerrilla war the discipline and experience of their hoplites could not prevail against local hostility. In a famous speech Timotheus told the Athenians that they must go out and save the Euboeans from 'enslavement' to Thebes. Aeschines also says that the Thebans were seeking to 'enslave' the island and that they were the first to invade it.<sup>3</sup> Apparently Athens gave her aid to Themison, and to Mnesarchus of Chalcis, who is also said to have done her a bad turn earlier; probably he had had some part in bringing the Euboeans out of the Athenian confederacy in c. 371.<sup>4</sup> Thus the only two 'anti-Thebans' in Euboea of whom we hear in 357 had previously been 'pro-Thebans'. These appellations may be misleading. Both Themison and Mnesarchus were perhaps, from first to last, Euboean patriots, who had thought that the interests of their own cities lay with Thebes in 371-66, but who were opposed to any intervention in Euboea by the Thebans which might have brought the cities there under the dominance of Thebes. It may seem odd to suggest that a tyrant could be a patriot. But Euphron of Sicyon, at least, was and remained after his death an honoured figure in his city.<sup>5</sup> We know nothing more of Themison, as he disappears from the record after 357; but he may also have been a popular ruler. However this may be, the events of 357 are surely inexplicable unless the great mass of Euboeans acted together to free Euboea from Theban control.

By 349 one Plutarchus was tyrant in Eretria.<sup>6</sup> As he ruled with the support of a mercenary force, he probably did not enjoy the goodwill of the citizens.<sup>7</sup> But he had influential friends at Athens, such as Midias.<sup>8</sup> There was an internal revolt against him, led by Clitarchus, who was later to become tyrant himself, but who must at this time have posed as a democratic leader (*infra*).<sup>9</sup> The Athenians sent a force to help him. A general rising throughout the island against the Athenians *followed*; and the Euboean cities seceded from the Athenian league once more.

The course of events is not very clear.<sup>10</sup> Plutarch says that the Athenians sent Phocion with a small force in the expectation that the Euboeans would join him, but that in fact the island was full of 'traitors' (an Athenian

<sup>1</sup> Tod 153-4 show that treaties were made with all four cities; 154 that the Carystians had rendered special services to Eretria. I find this document mysterious. It imposes penalties *κατὰ [τὰς σπονδὰς]* on those who had invaded Eretrian territory, apparently from Attica itself and from allied cities, and likewise on Athenians and allies who in future attack allied cities. It is hard to imagine how or why Athenians and allies should have acted in this way. It seems to be implied that Eretria, despite her secession in or soon after 371, was regarded as legally still a member of the league at the time of the operations in 357. This conception may underlie Aeschines' suggestions that in 341 the Euboeans after their second

secession in 348 still owed *syntaxis* to Athens (*infra*).

<sup>2</sup> A. 3. 85.

<sup>3</sup> D. 8. 74.

<sup>4</sup> D. 18. 99 (naming Theodorus with Themison); A. loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7. 3. 12.

<sup>6</sup> He had replaced Menestratus mentioned by D. 23. 124 as a friend of Athens.

<sup>7</sup> D. 9. 57. Mr. Griffith remarks that Euphron at Sicyon also had mercenaries, though he was or became popular.

<sup>8</sup> D. 21. 110; 200.

<sup>9</sup> Schol. on D. 5. 5.

<sup>10</sup> On the chronology Cawkwell i is decisive. See Plut. *Phoc.* 12-14. 1 (what follows in 14. 2 ff. belongs to 341, but Plutarch is unaware of the interval); A. 3. 85-8.

interpretation of their conduct) ; Phocion was in great peril, and took up a strong defensive position near Tamynae. This account is amplified by Aeschines, who actually served with Phocion ; he says that when Phocion had reached Tamynae, Callias of Chalcis, the son of Mnesarchus (*supra*), mustered a large force against him from the whole island, while his brother, Taurosthenes, brought over Phocian mercenaries to join in the attack. Phocion was beleaguered. News of this reached Athens, where it was proposed that all the remaining cavalry should be sent to Euboea, that an expedition should be made *πανδημεί*, and (on the motion of Apollodorus) that the surplus revenues should be diverted from the theoric to the war fund. But in the meantime Phocion had attacked the Euboeans and gained a famous victory ; on the news the Athenians seem to have let all the emergency decisions they had taken lapse ; Apollodorus' decree was annulled on a *graphe paranomon*.<sup>1</sup> It was evidently assumed that the recovery of Euboea was now certain. The tyrant, Plutarchus, had disgraced himself in the battle and, according to Plutarch, Phocion expelled him from Eretria, fortified Zaretra, and then returned home, leaving Molossus in command, presumably of a small garrison. A few weeks later, Phocion himself is found at Lesbos.<sup>2</sup> Athenian confidence was misplaced. Molossus actually fell into the hands of the enemy, and the Euboean cities were recognized as independent of Athens under a peace which was being negotiated in the summer of 348.<sup>3</sup> A mysterious part was played in this débâcle by Plutarchus, if we may believe the story in a scholiast on Demosthenes (p. 248 n. 9), that in order to pay his mercenaries Plutarchus arrested select Athenians, who were ransomed for 50 talents. Whatever be the truth in this, Plutarchus was not the beneficiary of the settlement ; he and his mercenaries left Eretria (p. 248 n. 7), where henceforth Clitarchus was the leading figure ; and in Chalcis Callias, who had led the pan-Euboean movement against Plutarchus and Athens, was dominant. Like the Thebans in 357, the Athenians had been driven out by a 'national' uprising, which occurred (as both Plutarch and Aeschines show) *after* they intervened on behalf of a hated tyrant.<sup>4</sup>

Cawkwell is right in rejecting the view that the Euboean rising was engineered by Philip to distract the Athenians from the defence of Olynthus. It is true that in the first *Philippic* Demosthenes had read out letters from Philip to the Euboeans.<sup>5</sup> Naturally Philip had tried to make trouble in the island where Athens was backing the unpopular Plutarchus. Aeschines indeed says that Callias sent for troops from Philip, if the manuscripts are sound.<sup>6</sup> Cawkwell and others would amend the text to read Phalaecus in place of

<sup>1</sup> [D.] 59. 3 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 207.

<sup>3</sup> Kahrstedt, 54 ff., argues that the capture of Molossus preceded the victory at Tamynae, which forced the Euboeans to sue for peace. This is in direct conflict with Plutarch, and is not warranted by A. 3. 88, which refers to a peace, but by no means to a peace on Athens' terms. The peace was negotiated in or just before the Olympic truce of 348 (A. 2. 12), i.e. in July or August ; the Euboean envoys said that they had been ordered by Philip to say that he too wished to be reconciled with Athens

(*ibid.*) ; from this, as well as from A. 2. 119 f. ; D. 19. 22 ; 220 ; 326 (on the hopes aroused at Athens in 346 that Philip would 'hand over' Euboea), it is clear that in 348 Euboea passed out of Athens' league into Philip's sphere of influence. Kahrstedt's view is false.

<sup>4</sup> Earlier too the presence of Spartan harmosts in Euboea may have led the Euboeans to join the Athenian league ; see Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 56 ; Diod. 15. 30, 3 (but cf. Plut. 773 F) ; Polyæn. 2. 7.

<sup>5</sup> D. 4. 37.

<sup>6</sup> A. 3. 87, cf. Cawkwell i. 129.

Philip; the scholiast says that Phalaecus furnished the Phocian mercenaries brought over by Taurosthenes. Emendation may be right but is not necessary. It is clear that before 342 there were no Macedonian troops in Euboea, but Aeschines, even if he did mention Philip, does not say that Callias actually obtained any. Moreover, since Callias was fighting Athens, and Philip too was at war with Athens, it was simply good sense if Callias applied to Philip for help; by the summer of 348 the Euboeans were certainly friends of Philip and could offer to mediate for Athens at the Macedonian court and by 346 it could be held that Philip was in a position to hand Euboea back to Athens (p. 249 n. 3). But even if we grant that Philip had tried to foment Euboean discontent, and that the Euboeans appealed to him in early 348 and thereafter became his friends, it does not follow that the Athenians intervened in the island to counteract Philip's activities. Plutarch thought they did, but his account is confused; he does not seem to be aware that years passed between the events just recorded and the undoubted Macedonian intervention of 342, and he was guilty of anachronism in his interpretation of the expedition of 348.<sup>1</sup> Both Aeschines (3. 86) and Demosthenes (supported by his scholiast) say quite simply that the Athenians went to the help of Plutarchus. And Demosthenes' attitude to the expedition is in itself sufficient evidence that it was not caused or justified by Philip's intrigues. Speaking in autumn 346, when memories were still fresh, he said: 'It was I, on the occasion when affairs in Euboea were in confusion and certain persons persuaded you to aid Plutarchus and to undertake a costly and inglorious war, who was the first and only man to come forward and speak in opposition, and I was all but torn in pieces by men who were induced for trifling gains to persuade you to commit many great errors. And after a short time had passed, and you had incurred dishonour as well as sufferings which none in our experience have ever suffered at the hands of those they assisted, you all recognized the villainy of the men who then prevailed on you and the fact that I had given the best advice.'<sup>2</sup> Now in 349/8 Demosthenes was intent on fighting Philip. He wished the Athenians to give the most effective help to Olynthus. But, important as the defence of Olynthus might be, he could not have failed to regard the defence of Euboea as more important still, if Euboea had been endangered by Philip. In his eyes, then, no such danger existed. The expedition was a distraction, dissipating Athens' resources, when every effort should have been made to save Olynthus.<sup>3</sup> By 346 no one dared justify it, as it had actually thrown Euboea into Philip's sphere of influence. It was not Philip who made the Euboeans 'pro-Macedonian': it was the Athenians, by using force on behalf of Plutarchus.

<sup>1</sup> He refers to tyrants installed by Philip; but in 349 the only known tyrant was the pro-Athenian Plutarchus.

<sup>2</sup> D. 5. 5. Probably he thought it dishonourable to aid a tyrant; cf. 15. 18. As to cost, after the expedition there was not even money to pay the dicasts, 39. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Tamynae was fought at about the time when the second expedition to Olynthus set out: Cawkwell i. 127-31. Olynthus was not yet cut off from the sea: *ibid.* 132. More effective aid could have prolonged her resistance. One may agree with Cawkwell

that Athens had not the resources for a lengthy war in the north; that was no reason for not doing all she could; no one could foretell that Philip would not be killed and Macedon relapse into anarchy, or that he might not be diverted himself by serious attacks from Illyria. Perhaps Athens should have made peace with Philip before 346: she should not have indulged in adventures *ἐξω τοῦ πολέμου*. Another such adventure was the petty squabble with Megara in 350/49 (Androtion F. 30; Philoch. F. 155; cf. D. 13. 32; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 204), also disapproved by D. 3. 20.

It is, therefore, strange that Cawkwell should write that 'the campaign miscarried to some extent', when it ended in a total reverse, or that 'it is to be noted that the island did not come under Philip or Thebes before the peace of 346': already in 348 it was within Philip's sphere of influence and had been lost to Athens.

Who proposed the expedition, and why? Midias is assailed by Demosthenes for his friendship with Plutarchus. Hegesileos, the cousin of Eubulus, was somehow implicated and was arraigned for deceiving the people. They were not politicians of the first order. Eubulus refused to defend Hegesileos, and he can hardly have been deeply involved; he retained his influence, though Demosthenes avers that the villainy of the authors of the expedition was universally recognized in retrospect; we are perhaps too apt to assume that whatever was done by Athens about this time was done on his advice.<sup>1</sup> But the authorship of the expedition is less important than the reasons by which it was commended to the people. One might surmise that the Athenians desired to dominate Euboea through such men as Plutarchus, who were thought to be wholly dependent on them. The hopes held out at Athens in Scirophorion 346 that Philip would restore Euboea to Athens in lieu of Amphipolis show that some Athenians wanted Euboea as a *possession* (p. 249 n. 3). The Euboeans naturally desired independence, an aim not incompatible with co-operation with Athens, as events soon showed, when Athens under Demosthenes' guidance adopted a more generous policy.

### III. EVENTS FROM 348 TO 341 B.C.

After the fall of Plutarchus a democracy was established in Eretria. Demosthenes, who is almost our sole informant, says that the Eretrians were divided between the partisans of Philip and those of Athens; the former persuaded the people to reject overtures from Athens and to exile their opponents; finally Philip sent Hipponicus with 1,000 mercenaries, who destroyed the walls of Porthmus, the fortress looking towards Attica in which, as Cawkwell reasonably conjectures, the 'pro-Athenians' had taken refuge, and established Clitarchus, the old enemy of Plutarchus, together with Hipparchus and Automedon as 'tyrants'. Even now there must have been guerillas in the countryside, still in arms against the new government, and Philip sent two further expeditions under Eurylochus and Parmenio respectively to repress them.<sup>2</sup>

At Oreus the story was somewhat similar. Here too the system was democratic, and here too Philip had his partisans led by Philistides. His chief opponent was Euphraeus, who had once lived at Athens according to Demosthenes; other sources tell us that he had been a pupil of Plato, who had sent him to instruct Perdiccas III of Macedon in philosophy; he had sought to introduce a puritan regime at the court, had done something to bring Philip into authority, but had fallen out of favour at Philip's accession. Demosthenes says that he impeached Philistides for treason, but that his enemies carried

<sup>1</sup> D. 19. 290 with scholiast; 21. 110; 200. Hegesileos was cousin of Eubulus, and Midias his friend (21. 206), but Eubulus' own implication is not attested. On Eubulus see especially Cawkwell, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963), 47 ff.

<sup>2</sup> D. 9. 57 f.; cf. 27, 33 and 66; 10. 8; 18. 71. In 18. 295 Demosthenes names

Sosistratus along with Hipparchus and Clitarchus as Euboean traitors. *Plut. Mor.* 178 D attests Hipparchus' early death. Clitarchus is often named alone as tyrant, e.g. A. 3. 103; D. 18. 71; Diod. 16. 74. 1. For an embassy of Clitarchus and Philistides at Athens, in unknown circumstances, see D. 18. 82.

him off to prison with the approval of the deluded populace. A reign of terror then ensued, and the citizens were helpless when the enemy approached the walls; some tried to resist, but others betrayed the city; Euphraeus committed suicide, his friends were killed or banished, and Philistides and his accomplices ruled as 'tyrants'. By 'the enemy' Demosthenes, of course, means the Macedonians, although they were not at war with Oreus, for elsewhere he says that Philip's mercenaries expelled 'the people', i.e. the democrats, from Oreus, as from Eretria. Carystius of Pergamum, a Hellenistic writer, states that Euphraeus was put to death by Parmenio.<sup>1</sup> Presumably we should prefer the contemporary account of Demosthenes, but may suppose that the force of mercenaries sent by Philip was commanded by Parmenio, and that the revolution at Oreus occurred at the time of the third Macedonian intervention in Eretria. Demosthenes usually refers to the events in Oreus after those in Eretria, and one of his allusions suggests that the base for the expedition of Parmenio was Antron, on the coast of Thessaly opposite the territory of Oreus, which he purchased, probably on a visit to Thessaly in 342.<sup>2</sup> It may be significant that Oreus was liberated earlier than Eretria, where three successive Macedonian interventions had perhaps done more to crush opposition.

The revolutions in Eretria and Oreus both belong to 342. At the trial of Aeschines in autumn or winter 343 Demosthenes speaks of the frequent alarm at Athens inspired by reports that Philip had troops near Porthmus or Megara.<sup>3</sup> He also refers to soldiers in Euboea and to bases Philip was fitting out there against Athens. These passages are most naturally read as implying that Philip already had forces in the island.<sup>4</sup> Yet Demosthenes would surely not have failed to mention explicitly the installation of pro-Macedonian tyrants, if it had already taken place. Perhaps here too we may have allusions only to rumours of Macedonian intervention. That interpretation has some support from the failure of Hegesippus to name Euboea in the catalogue of Philip's aggressions that appears in his speech *On Halonnesus*.<sup>5</sup> There is indeed some ground for doubting whether Hegesippus' catalogue is complete (see Appendix); but he accuses Philip of garrisoning the acropolis of Pherae; any similar action in Euboea would surely have aroused more fear and indignation among his public. This speech can only be dated by its references to Philip's campaign in Epirus and Cassopia<sup>6</sup> and to the reported fact that he was marching

<sup>1</sup> D. 9. 59-62; cf. 12. 27 and 33; 8. 18, 36 and 59; 10. 9; Carystius *ap.* Athen. xi 506 E; 508 D = *FHG* iv F 1-2; [Plato] *ep.* 5; Suda s.v. Euphraeus.

<sup>2</sup> D. 10. 9; cf. Schäfer, ii. 430 n. 1. D. 18. 71 reverses usual order. On 10. 8f. see Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> D. 19. 87. The speech is dated to 343/2 by Dionysius, rightly; Phocion was general at the time (A. 2. 184), and he was serving Artaxerxes in Cyprus in 344/3 (the correct date for events described by Diod. 16. 42. 7; 46. 1). There is no reference in the speech to Philip's campaign in Epirus and threat to Ambracia; cf. n. 6. Autumn or winter 343/2 is indicated (cf. Beloch iii. 2. 291). For Megara cf. Appendix.

<sup>4</sup> 19. 204; 326. Perhaps on publication

these passages were touched up to fit events rather later than the time of delivery; I believe that Demosthenes did this with many speeches.

<sup>5</sup> 7. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Philip's operations in Cassopia should be after the expulsion of Arybbas from Epirus. Diod. 16. 72. 1 dated this to 342/1, but wrongly; from midsummer 342 Philip was fighting in Thrace (D. 8. 2 and 35). It cannot be later than spring 342. The threat to Ambracia provoked the Athenian expedition to Acarnania in 343/2 (D. 48. 24-6) and the embassies of the same year (p. 257 nn. 2; 4; 5), which is also that assigned to the speech *On Halonnesus* by Dionysius. Speusippus' letter which asserts Philip's right to Ambracia is usually dated just after



on Ambracia; from these it seems to follow that it was delivered or published not later than spring 342, since by June or July of that year Philip had been recalled from the north-west to suppress a revolt in Thrace. The revolutions in Eretria and Oreus had occurred when Demosthenes delivered or published his eighth and ninth speeches in spring 341.<sup>1</sup> To give time for no less than three Macedonian interventions in Euboea, it seems best to suppose that Hegesippus' speech should be dated to the very beginning of the calendar year, 342.

At Chalcis things did not go well for Philip. Here the principal leader was Callias. He is mainly known to us from the hostile account of Aeschines;<sup>2</sup> himself the *proxenus* at Athens of Clitarchus and Philistides (if we may trust Demosthenes),<sup>3</sup> Aeschines has not a word against these manifest tools of Philip but seeks to blacken the reputation of the Euboean, who was to be a leading associate of Demosthenes in opposition to Macedon. However, Aeschines' facts may be largely true, in contrast to his interpretation of them. Kahrstedt rightly held that Callias stood for 'Euboea for the Euboeans'; possibly this programme concealed the ambition to make Chalcis dominant in Euboea.<sup>4</sup>

Callias had taken a leading part in the resistance to Athens in 348, and had perhaps already at that time sought aid from Philip (*supra*). For this, according to Aeschines, the Athenians 'pardoned' him, yet very soon he was trying to establish a so-called Euboean *synedrion* at Chalcis, to strengthen Euboea against Athens, and to make himself tyrant of the island; to this end he went off to Macedon and became one of Philip's *hetairoi*. The statement that Athens pardoned Callias is part of Aeschines' consistent attempt to make it appear that Euboea was still under Athenian control after 348, until Demosthenes corruptly abandoned that control (in 341); in fact, of course, it no longer lay with Athens to pardon a Euboean. No doubt Callias was one of the Euboean representatives at Pella in early summer 346,<sup>5</sup> and tried to secure Philip's approval for a Euboean *synedrion*. It was, however, probably Philip's view that in his own interest Greek cities should continue to be as divided and, therefore, as weak as possible; and the representatives of other Euboean cities, Clitarchus for instance, may have had no enthusiasm for a scheme under which Chalcis would enjoy the primacy. Aeschines says that Callias wronged Philip and ran away; there is no means of determining what truth, if any, underlay this allegation. He then sought the backing of Thebes. As his father, Mnesarchus, had been instrumental in expelling the Thebans in 357 from Euboea (p. 248), he may not have been well received there on personal

the Persian recovery of Egypt in winter 343/2 (cf. Cawkwell ii. 122 n. 4), but I do not feel sure that the shortage of papyrus at Athens must have been an *immediate* effect of that event; we do not know what stocks were kept.

<sup>1</sup> Both speeches presuppose much the same situation, but the eighth seems slightly earlier; the ninth is dated to 342/1 by 72, but is earlier than the liberation of Oreus; and both seem to belong to the beginning of a campaigning season.

<sup>2</sup> A. 3. 86-102.

<sup>3</sup> D. 18. 82, alleging that Aeschines was host to envoys from Clitarchus and Philistides, perhaps in summer 341; the tyrants, fearing that Philip would not be able to protect them because of the Thracian revolt, might then have sought to make terms with Athens. Cawkwell, ii. 207 n. 4; 211 n. 1, gravely underrates the political significance of the *proxenia*; cf. S. Perlman, *C.Q.* viii (1958), 185 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Kahrstedt, 75.

<sup>5</sup> A. 2. 112 with D. 19. 22.

grounds, and the Thebans may still have entertained hopes of recovering the island, which was less likely to come under their power if the Euboean cities were united. As Callias sought outside assistance for his schemes, it looks as if he expected opposition from other cities in Euboea and was ready to put it down by force; this was ultimately what he did, with force supplied by Athens.

According to Aeschines, he turned to Athens only when he had incurred the hatred of Philip and Thebes and was apprehensive of a joint expedition they might send against him; he now sent envoys to Athens and induced Demosthenes by bribes to pass a decree under which Chalcis was to become an ally of Athens, but not to send a *synedros*, nor to contribute *syntaxeis*, to the Athenian league. Aeschines had the decree read out in court, and what he says of its terms must be correct. On a later occasion, he continues, Callias appeared in person at Athens and stated that on a mission to the Peloponnese he had obtained an undertaking from the Achaeans and Megarians that they would pay 60 talents for operations against Philip, while all the Euboean cities would contribute 40. These funds would support an army and fleet. Many other Greeks were also ready to co-operate, and secret negotiations were also in progress. Demosthenes then reported on the upshot of his mission to Acarnania and the Peloponnese; all the Acarnanians and all the Peloponnesians were ready to combine against Philip; there was money for 100 fast ships, for 10,000 foot, and 1,000 horse (evidently mercenaries), and in addition over 2,000 citizen hoplites were available from the Peloponnese and as many from Acarnania; all would concede the hegemony to Athens, and would meet at Athens through *synedroi* on 16 Anthesterion. According to Aeschines nothing came of these boasts, but they enabled Demosthenes to pass a second decree 'longer than the *Iliad*' (which was also read to the court), under which the Athenians were to send ambassadors to Eretria, inviting that city to pay its *syntaxis* of 5 talents, 'no longer to you, but to Callias', and others to Oreus, to conclude a treaty of alliance: Oreus too was to pay 'the 5 talents not to you, but to Callias'. Aeschines would have his hearers forget that neither Eretria nor Oreus nor Chalcis itself had been paying *syntaxeis* to Athens since 348. The only question at this time was, therefore, whether the Euboean cities were to be required to rejoin the Athenian league as a condition of becoming allies of Athens again, or to be allowed to form a league of their own with *syntaxeis*, apparently at the old level,<sup>1</sup> and freely co-operate against Philip. Aeschines' suggestion that Demosthenes' decrees deprived Athens of *syntaxeis* is utterly false. He supports it by alleging that Demosthenes was bribed to betray Athens' interests; he had received a talent apiece from Callias, from the tyrant Clitarchus (*infra*), and from Oreus. Of these cities only Oreus was democratic according to Aeschines, who implies throughout that Callias was a tyrant at Chalcis; and from Oreus alone evidence of Demosthenes' corruption was to be had; a decree of that city showed that they were paying a talent

<sup>1</sup> It seems that each Euboean city must previously have paid 5 talents to the Athenian league. In 448/7 Chalcis had been assessed at 5 talents, Eretria probably at 6; but these assessments may already have taken account of confiscation of land for Athenian cleruchs (see *Anc. Society and In-*

*stitutions*, *St. pres. to V. Ehrenberg*, 1966, 88 f.); if so, *syntaxeis* were less burdensome than the old *phoros*, even before the reassessment of 425/4, when Chalcis and Eretria were required to pay 10 and 15 talents respectively. There is no other evidence for the level of *syntaxeis*.

with interest to Demosthenes at a time when they were exhausted by the war. It is evident that this represents repayment of a loan, and not the payment of a talent as a bribe; if that had found its way into Demosthenes' purse, Oreus would have had nothing to repay.<sup>1</sup> Aeschines' 'evidence' is ludicrous.

#### IV. THE CHRONOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Aeschines supplies no dates: when did these events occur? Demosthenes implies that Chalcis was hostile to Macedon in his speeches of spring 341, but he says nothing of an alliance.<sup>2</sup> The alliance, to which Demosthenes' first decree apparently relates, is precisely dated. Philochorus recorded that in 342/1 'the Athenians made an alliance with the Chalcidians and along with them liberated Oreus under the command of Cephisophon; Philistides the tyrant came to an end.'<sup>3</sup> The scholiast on Aeschines dates the expedition to Scirophorion,<sup>4</sup> and this month can and should be restored in the text of Philochorus. Cephisophon's expedition thus went out about June 341. No doubt it followed at once after the conclusion of the alliance. If Chalcis was menaced with attack, it was vital to seize Oreus without delay, and so to cut communications between Philip's possible bases in Thessaly and the rest of Euboea.<sup>5</sup> The alliance might be put in May 341.

It seems natural to set Demosthenes' second decree after the liberation of both Oreus and Eretria. Now Philochorus recorded under 341/0 that 'the Athenians crossed to Eretria under the command of Phocion and besieged Clitarchus in order to restore the democracy. Clitarchus was formerly of the faction opposed to Plutarchus, and after his expulsion became tyrant. The Athenians reduced him by siege and handed the city back to the people.' Other sources give the same date.<sup>6</sup> The entry in Philochorus begins with the words *ἐπὶ τούτου*, and on Jacoby's view (p. 256 n. 3) this means that Phocion's expedition was the first event recorded in 341/0; given the detailed character his annals must have had for this period, it should then be not later than August.

But in Aeschines' story Clitarchus was still in power when Demosthenes moved the second decree. It seems then that (a) in 341 the pro-Macedonian tyrant, Clitarchus, actually joined an anti-Macedonian league; (b) none the less, he was then overthrown by his own allies; (c) the liberation of Oreus, the embassies of Demosthenes and Callias round the Peloponnese, the formation of the Euboean league including Clitarchus, and the overthrow of Clitarchus are all crowded into the months of June, July, and August 341; and

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. 491, conjectured that Demosthenes lent Oreus money for war preparations, just as he and other Athenians were guarantors for Chalcis in respect of ships Chalcis borrowed from Athens (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 809 c 42 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> D. 8. 18, 9; 74.

<sup>3</sup> F. 159. Cf. Cawkwell's plausible conjecture, ii. 212 n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The text is conveniently quoted by Jacoby, iii b Suppl., p. 535, together with Charax F. 19, who adds that the Megarians assisted.

<sup>5</sup> The activity of Callias in capturing

Thessalian places in the gulf of Pagasae was probably ancillary to the Oreus expedition; see D. 12. 5 where Philip calls him an Athenian general, doubtless because he had been given Athenian ships (n. 1 above).

<sup>6</sup> F. 160-1; Diod. 16. 74. 1; Schol. Aesch. (n. 4 above). Ps.-Plut. 849 f with 848 E seems to show that there was apprehension at Athens that Philip was going to send a fleet to Euboea and that Phocion's expedition also engaged in the relief of Byzantium; whether it did so before or after the overthrow of Clitarchus will depend on the date assigned to that event.

(d) the conference of anti-Macedonian cities was fixed for February/March 340 in the early part of summer of 341, though one might have expected that at that time arrangements would have been made for common action to be taken during the campaigning season of 341, which was not yet far advanced.

These difficulties are mitigated by Beloch's hypothesis.<sup>1</sup> He holds that Clitarchus did not fall until May or June 340, and explains that he entered the league because he was cut off from Philip by the liberation of Oreus; moreover, Philip was presumably preoccupied by the Thracian revolt. However, the allies did not trust Clitarchus and finally sent Phocion against him. Beloch's positive arguments for putting the expedition at the very end of 341/0 are inconclusive, and others would prefer a date in the autumn for no stronger reasons.<sup>2</sup> One would think that the conference for Anthesterion 340 was arranged after the end of the campaigning season, and that on this view Clitarchus could not have been overthrown until very late in 341 at earliest. His entry into the league and eventual fall can be explained in the same way as on Beloch's hypothesis.

Either of these chronologies is incompatible with Jacoby's belief that ἐπὶ τοῦτου prefaced the first entry Philochorus made in each archon year, and that each subsequent entry was linked by καί.<sup>3</sup> Certainly *some* entries were so linked, but as we have no complete record for any year, we cannot be sure that *all* were. After several such entries, Philochorus might for variation have referred back to the name of the archon, prefacing a new entry either by ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῖνα or by ἐπὶ τοῦτου. The latter formula occurs five times in our fragments, and there is no independent evidence that any but one of them must be the first entry of the year.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Jacoby himself acknowledges that citations are 'hardly ever diplomatically accurate by modern standards', and in one case writes that he is not confident that the formula comes from Philochorus.<sup>5</sup> Phocion's expedition can then be dated to autumn 341 or even to early summer 340. Certainly if we believe (as all scholars seem to do) Aeschines' assertion that Clitarchus joined the anti-Macedonian league, we must in my view conclude in favour of one of these dates.

But is Aeschines so easily to be believed? It seems very unlikely that the second decree he refers to, which was read out in court, explicitly mentioned Clitarchus, even if he was in power at Eretria at the time. In his own summary of it Aeschines says that it proposed that ambassadors should be sent to Eretria to ask the Eretrians to pay *syntaxeis* to 'Callias'. Aeschines wished to make it appear that Demosthenes moved this decree because he had been bribed. In support of this contention he cited a decree from Oreus. He had no 'evidence' of any kind for a bribe from Eretria. He seeks to explain this by the fact that Oreus, unlike Eretria, was democratically governed and did everything by decree. Ten years later, his auditors could have forgotten the exact sequence of events and might well have accepted his statement that Clitarchus was still tyrant at a time later than his overthrow. If this is possible, we could accept Jacoby's dating of Phocion's expedition, and still believe that the formation of the anti-Macedonian league belongs to the autumn or winter of 341/0.

<sup>1</sup> iii. 1. 552; 2. 293.

<sup>2</sup> Kahrstedt 77 f.; Wüst 112, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> iii b Suppl., p. 532, citing F. 121 for καί.

<sup>4</sup> F. 49-51 (certain), 54, 56, 157 (cf. Cawkwell ii. 121 ff.), 160 (the present case).

<sup>5</sup> iii b Suppl., p. 530; cf. 330 (doubting his own doctrine on F. 54).

There is yet another possibility which I prefer but cannot prove. When Aeschines had the second decree read out, he told the herald to leave out 'the boasting and the triremes and the humbug', i.e. all that concerned the Peloponnesian embassy, and to read only what concerned Euboea. Of this no doubt he had given an accurate summary. At Oreus the envoys were to discuss both an alliance and *syntaxeis*; at Eretria only *syntaxeis*, no word of alliance. Moreover, his words suggest that strong pressure would be needed at Eretria to pay *syntaxeis* to the Euboean league;<sup>1</sup> there is no indication that she had yet joined it. This is intelligible if Clitarchus was still in power. We might surmise that the embassy to Clitarchus was sent because Athens preferred to treat with him rather than to try to take a fortified city and divert forces more urgently needed in the Bosphorus, but that it failed, and no choice remained but to send an expedition. The decree then belongs to summer 341, just after the liberation of Oreus, which the conclusion of alliance with that city should follow at once, and just before the overthrow of Clitarchus. But in that case it was also before the mission of Demosthenes and Callias to the Peloponnese, which should belong to autumn or winter 341. This mission, which did establish the basis of the coalition that was to fight at Chaeronea (p. 263 n. 2), Aeschines could have deliberately confused with Demosthenes' mission in 343/2, from which Athens derived no military aid. The confusion was easy, since his assertions about the embassy of Demosthenes and Callias could not be controlled by the document he cited, from which the relevant part, really concerned with an earlier mission, was omitted. Unfortunately, this trick has misled Cawkwell, who believes that the embassy of Demosthenes and Callias actually belongs to 343/2 and consequently misplaces the decree. The distinction between the embassies of 343/2 and 341/0 must be proved once more.

Early in 342 Philip was threatening or supposed to be threatening Ambracia (p. 252 n. 6). This threat evidently led the Athenians to send a force to Acarnania; on the same occasion presumably Demosthenes went on an embassy to Ambracia;<sup>2</sup> it was always his line that diplomacy could only succeed when it was backed by military force.<sup>3</sup> Naturally he must have also visited the Acarnanians.<sup>4</sup> In the spring of 341 he refers also to 'the embassies last year (343/2) round the Peloponnese conducted by myself and Polyeuctus . . . and Hegesippus and the other envoys', whereby 'we prevented Philip from approaching Ambracia and invading the Peloponnese'. The scholiast on Aeschines puts in 343/2 Athenian alliances with the Achaeans, the Arcadians who sided with Mantinea, Argos, Megalopolis, and Messene. An extant document dates the alliance with Messene to Scirophorion 342.<sup>5</sup> It is this diplomatic mission of Demosthenes and these alliances that Cawkwell equates with the alliances of Aeschines' story. It may be noted that in his reference to his success in 342 Demosthenes does not name Callias among his fellow envoys, and that whereas Aeschines makes Callias boast of the aid promised by the Achaeans, Megarians,

<sup>1</sup> A. 3. 100; note *πάνν γὰρ εἶδει δεσθῆναι*.

<sup>2</sup> D. 48. 24-6; 18. 244.

<sup>3</sup> D. 14. 12; 2. 12; 9. 70 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Curiously, only A. 3. 97 f. mentions Demosthenes' diplomacy in Acarnania. But the Acarnanians fought at Chaeronea on Athens' side (Tod 178).

<sup>5</sup> D. 9. 72; *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 225; the scholiast quoted ad loc. or in Jacoby, iii b Suppl., p. 534, puts Diopithes' attack on Cardia at the same time or subsequently (343/2, Philoch. F. 158); doubtless Diopithes was encouraged both by the revolt in Thrace and by the success of Athenian diplomacy.

and Euboeans, the scholiast has no allusion to the last two, and Demosthenes himself says nothing of any embassy to Euboea.

Cawkwell rightly observes that the activity described by Aeschines cannot be as early as his trial in autumn 343, when Demosthenes refers to the Euboeans as 'accursed';<sup>1</sup> at that time they were all, including Chalcis, in Philip's sphere of influence. It follows that the Anthesterion mentioned by Aeschines cannot be that of 343. Nor can it be that of 341, when Oreus and Eretria were virtually Macedonian bases. He therefore opts for 342. From this in turn it follows that the diplomacy of Demosthenes and Callias would have to be placed in winter 343/2. Now Aeschines implies that the conference summoned for Anthesterion never met and that nothing came of the diplomacy. But the treaty with Messene was sworn months after Anthesterion 342. Demosthenes' diplomacy in 343/2 cannot, therefore, have been in winter 343/2 and must have been subsequent to Anthesterion 342.<sup>2</sup> Hence Aeschines is referring to Anthesterion in another year.

This is not all. On Cawkwell's view we have to posit that Eretria and Oreus were hostile to Athens in autumn 343, friendly in winter 343/2, and hostile again later in 342. How can such a double diplomatic revolution be explained? It would be easy, perhaps, if the cities had come under the influence of rival factions by turns. But there is no evidence that 'pro-Athenians' gained the ascendancy at any time between 348 and 341. On the contrary, taking at face value the evidence of Aeschines which Cawkwell accepts, Clitarchus was tyrant just when Eretria joined an anti-Macedonian combination. And what evidence we have shows that Clitarchus was installed in power by Philip. It makes nonsense of his career to suppose that in 342 he deserted Philip even for a moment; it is conceivable that he did so under *force majeure* in 341 (p. 256).

There is no trace in Demosthenes' speeches in spring 341 of the temporary *rapprochement* between Eretria or Oreus and the Athenians which Cawkwell postulates. He only mentions an unsuccessful approach by Athens to Eretria to those cities.<sup>3</sup> Suppose that Aeschines' account is correct and correctly dated by Cawkwell: then we should have to say that Demosthenes' diplomacy in 342 had proved ineffectual by spring 341, that the coalition he had boasted of cementing had dissolved. Demosthenes was now proposing a further Peloponnesian embassy<sup>4</sup> and would have needed to explain away his previous failure. He would not have lacked an excuse: the blame could be laid on the perfidy of the Eretrians and Oreans; that would have been a further count against the philippizers. Demosthenes makes no such excuse; instead he can still claim his mission of the previous year as a notable success. He has indeed nothing to say of ships and men promised by the allies, and that is natural enough, if at that time no city had promised any. As yet only Megara and Chalcis could be relied on to fight Philip.<sup>5</sup> We are long before the negotiations he and Callias brought to a more triumphant conclusion.

Even Chalcis is not yet an ally. The alliance is indeed dated by Philochorus immediately before the Oreus expedition of 341 (p. 255). Cawkwell acknowledges the difficulty this makes for his view. So far as I can make out, his solution is to suppose that in 342 Athens made an alliance with the Euboean

<sup>1</sup> D. 19. 75.

<sup>2</sup> On Cawkwell's view we might also expect some reference to the embassies in the

speech *On Halonnesus*: cf. pp. 252 f. for its date.

<sup>3</sup> 9. 66.

<sup>4</sup> 9. 71.

<sup>5</sup> 9. 74.

league, not with individual cities.<sup>1</sup> But Aeschines speaks explicitly of an alliance with Oreus, and this treaty must belong to 342, if his narrative relates (as Cawkwell thinks) to that date. It goes without saying that Chalcis would have made a similar treaty somewhat earlier. And that treaty would have remained in force, even though the Euboean league, in accordance with Cawkwell's hypothesis, was formed in 343/2 and broken up in the same year; hence there would have been no need to make a new treaty in 341. As such a treaty certainly was made then, we may conclude that there had been no alliance in 342.

Cawkwell also appeals to a passage in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* where he lists certain measures he had proposed 'in seemingly chronological order'. The list need not be complete.<sup>2</sup> It first mentions an embassy to the Peloponnese 'when Philip first began to creep into the Peloponnese'; this might be either that which preceded the second *Philippic* or the embassy of 343/2. In either case it is earlier, as Cawkwell says, than the embassy to Euboea which is mentioned next and which itself precedes the decree for expeditions to Oreus and Eretria. But this embassy to Euboea can be one sent to ratify the alliance with Chalcis in spring 341 and need not be equated, as Cawkwell seems to think, with one of those authorized under the second decree of Aeschines' narrative. The embassy of Demosthenes and Callias round the Peloponnese does not, in my opinion, appear in this list at all.

Cawkwell's chronology rests then only on Aeschines' allusions to Clitarchus, and these can be explained by any one of three hypotheses under which the orator's narrative of the embassy of Callias and Demosthenes relates to 341. A dating to 343/2 is demonstrably false.

## V. INTERPRETATION

It remains to interpret the events of 342/1 and to consider their outcome.

Demosthenes' account of the revolutions in Euboea in 342 may not be entirely true. It is unlikely that any of the Euboean leaders were from the outset mere hirelings of Philip. Like Callias, Clitarchus rose to power as the enemy of a local tyrant and the opponent of Athenian control; both he and Philistides were at first democratic leaders.<sup>3</sup> But whereas they had originally sought the friendship of Philip as a protector of their own cities against Athens,

<sup>1</sup> ii. 213.

<sup>2</sup> D. 18. 79. Demosthenes himself went on embassies, (1) to Messene and Argos in 344 (6. 19 ff.); (2) to Ambracia, Acarnania, and the Peloponnese in 342 (p. 267 nn. 2, 4-5); (3) to Thessaly in a year that cannot be determined (18. 244, where he says with evident falsehood that it was successful); (4) to the Illyrians and Thracian kings, probably in 341 (ibid.); (5) to Byzantium in 341 or 340 (ibid.); (6) with Callias to the Peloponnese in 341/0; (7) to Thebes in 339 (18. 244). Of these in my view either (1) or (2) and (5) and probably (4) were authorized by decrees he moved himself (18. 79 f.). So was (7); cf. 18. 178, not mentioned in 79 f. Moreover, A. 3. 91-3 shows that Demosthenes

must have proposed an embassy to Chalcis before the embassy to Euboea to which A. 3. 100 relates. D. 18. 79 names only one embassy to Euboea.

<sup>3</sup> As Plato and Aristotle noted, and Thucydides shows (e.g. 8. 63. 3), demagogues might easily turn into tyrants. It is misleading for Cawkwell to suggest that Philistides did not become a tyrant because he was the popular leader (ii. 203). It seems curious that one of Plato's pupils should have been the genuine democratic leader at Oreus, but for a parallel cf. Plut. *Mor.* 805 D; 1126 C (Phormio at Elis). Democratic 'patriots' could be discredited by charges of peculation; cf. D. 19. 294.

they ended by calling in his help against internal rivals, and relied on Macedonian force to make themselves 'tyrants'.

Cawkwell observes that the term 'tyrant' can be one of mere abuse. It is clear that both Clitarchus and Philistides shared their power with others. At most, they were heads of juntas. But the term is invariably applied to them; they seem to have expelled the 'people'; and at Eretria the fall of Clitarchus was probably followed by a law against 'tyranny'.<sup>1</sup> They are conspicuously absent from Polybius' list of the local patriots whom Demosthenes malevolently assailed.<sup>2</sup> It can hardly be doubted that their governments were narrow and oppressive, *dynasteiai* rather than tyrannies in the strict sense,<sup>3</sup> and that they relied on external force.

Though we cannot be sure that Callias would not have 'philippized' if only Philip had been ready to stand behind him and make Chalcis dominant in Euboea, in actual fact he behaved throughout as a patriot. Just as his father had called in Athens to overthrow Theban control, so he too acted decisively first against Athens and then against Philip, when each in turn threatened the independence of Chalcis. His aim was to do more than preserve the freedom of Chalcis: it was to make Chalcis head of a Euboean league. This was a natural objective for a Chalcidian. We do not know how far it corresponded to the sentiments of Euboeans in general. There is some evidence for a pan-Euboean movement in common coinage earlier in the fourth century. But the individual cities did not cease to issue their own coins, and the types of Carystian coins differ from those of the rest.<sup>4</sup> In fourth-century treaties the individual cities generally appear as the contracting parties.<sup>5</sup> There is one exception, a fragment of a treaty made by Athens with the Euboeans.<sup>6</sup> Consistently with his reconstruction, Cawkwell dates it to 342. On my view it must, of course, belong to 341/0, but to a time later than that of which Aeschines tells, when Athens had a separate alliance with Chalcis and was about to make one with Oreus. I suggest that the Euboean *koinon* was then still in process of formation; Clitarchus had not yet fallen, and perhaps Carystus, of which there is no mention, had still to enter; once the work of Callias had been completed, the friendship of Athens and the Euboeans was confirmed by a new treaty between Athens and the *koinon*, superseding the treaties already made between Athens and individual cities.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *IG* xii. 9. 190.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 246 n. 5. Philip too in his letter to Athens does not dare defend his own interventions in Euboea or impeach those of Athens.

<sup>3</sup> For *dynasteiai* see Thuc. 3. 62. 3, 4. 78. 3, and esp. Arist. *Pol.* 1292<sup>b</sup>5; 1293<sup>a</sup>30, where an oligarchy called *dynasteia*, in which the *archontes* and not the laws rule, is expressly assimilated to tyranny or monarchy. Cf. Thuc. 6. 60. 1: ξυνουσία ἀνταρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ; Andoc. 2. 97 for Demophantus' decree of 410, equating the overthrow of democracy with the establishment of tyranny, with patent reference to events in 411; the equation reappears in the Athenian law against tyranny of 337/6 (*Hesperia*, 1952, 355 ff.); compare the appellation of the 'Thirty Tyrants'. At Pharsalus Thrasydaeus

cannot have been properly a tyrant (*contra* Theop. F. 209) in view of the position of Daochus (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> 274 with notes), who is often linked with him (*ibid.*, pp. 315; 444 f.; D. 18. 295; Plut. *Dem.* 18); a narrow oligarchy must be meant, though Arist. *Pol.* 1306<sup>a</sup>10 regarded it as beneficent and stable. A tyranny shared by members of one family is something different.

<sup>4</sup> Head, *Hist. Num.*<sup>2</sup> 362 f.; Regling, *IG* xii. 9, p. 172, cf. Cawkwell ii. 211 n. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Tod 124, 141, 153; *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 230a; A. 3. 100.

<sup>6</sup> *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 149; cf. Cawkwell ii. 211 n. 7 (though the name Hestiaea is used even in non-Attic documents, see Tod 141; 172 v. 3).

<sup>7</sup> The Chalcis treaty perhaps provided for the constitution of an Euboean *koinon*, rather as the lost treaty of Athens with



Philip's interventions in Euboea in 342 were gravely misjudged, for they consolidated much of Greek opinion against him, and gave Demosthenes and his friends better grounds for claiming that the growth of his power threatened the liberties of all Greek cities.<sup>1</sup> At Athens the loss of Amphipolis and Potidaea had not been forgiven, but other Greeks could not be expected to share this resentment, and probably thought no worse of Philip for destroying Olynthus than they thought of Thebes for destroying Plataea and Orchomenus or of Athens for annexing Samos or of Sparta for her desire to re-enslave the Messenians. Up to 346 Philip's conduct was easily defensible; in Thessaly he had overthrown tyrants, restored peace, and on the whole earned the lasting loyalty of the Thessalians not only by these measures but by giving them back their control at Delphi;<sup>2</sup> in Euboea he had been protecting those who had reasserted the independence of the cities; and his treatment of the Phocians had a religious justification. He made it clear that he was ready to protect Peloponnesian cities against Spartan aggression.<sup>3</sup> But in the next few years he dissipated much of the goodwill he had probably secured.

Mr. G. T. Griffith has rightly pointed out to me that the impact of Philip's intervention in Euboea must have been greatest at Athens and Thebes. Both cities must have felt that they were being encircled. Aeschines' acquittal in 343 shows that at the time of his trial opinion at Athens was still fairly evenly balanced; by 341 Demosthenes and his friends were in control. The dominance of Philip in Euboea must have aroused hardly less resentment in Thebes, especially as that city had once sought to impose her own will on the island. In Mr. Griffith's view the Peloponnesians were less disturbed; the Euboean *coups* were at worst the most patent instances of what Greek cities had to fear from the growth of Macedonian power, and Philip's intrigues in Elis, the alleged threat to Ambracia (which naturally evoked the hostility of her metropolis, Corinth), and the danger to Megara, indeed even the experience of the more distant Thessalians in 344, may have done more to alienate feeling in the Peloponnese. But it was only cities in the Isthmus, the Peloponnese, and Central Greece which had particular reasons for hostility to Philip that promised or gave aid to an anti-Macedonian coalition. Sparta was not among them; her resources were employed in Archidamus' expedition in Italy. And it was because of Archidamus' absence that the anti-Spartan cities in the Peloponnese, which in 344 had leaned on Philip, were ready in the summer of 342 to conclude an alliance with Athens; but fear of Sparta remained latent; the alliance did no more than secure their neutrality, and after Chaeronea they welcomed Philip into the Peloponnese.

The explanation of Philip's conduct is not easy to find. Did he aim at imposing his rule on Greek cities by securing that local power was always in the hands of politicians subservient to him? If so, he gave up this policy later;

Chios in 378 provided for the establishment of the second Athenian league (S. Accame, *La Lega Atiniese*, 1941, 34).

<sup>1</sup> In the third *Philippic* 'Hellas' or 'Hellenes' occurs 29 times: in speeches 1-4 only 6 times; there D. refers mainly to Athenian interests.

<sup>2</sup> Isocr. 5. 20; *ep.* 2. 20; D. 10. 67; 18. 43; Diod. 16. 69. 8. D. spoke of Thessalian jealousy of Philip's aggrandisement (5. 23)

or of their enslavement (19. 260; 9. 26); he suggested that Philip could not rely on them (1. 22, cf. 23. 111) and tried to win them over by diplomacy (p. 259 n. 2); Philip did need to intervene in Thessaly in 344 and perhaps 342 to strengthen his control; but in the main the Thessalians remained faithful to Macedon until the Lamian war.

<sup>3</sup> Isocr. 5. 73 f.; D. 5. 18 (cf. Paus. 10. 8. 2); 6. 9 and 13 (with Hypothesis).

for he did not impose governments of his own choice on all Greek cities after Chaeronea. Perhaps he simply misjudged local conditions and hearkened too readily to petitions for his help from politicians who had deserved his friendship. I am inclined to believe that his purpose was mainly to isolate and encircle Athens. If he already designed an attack on Persia, which had to be postponed first because of trouble in the north and then because of the growth of opposition in Greece, a hypothesis which I think probable but cannot argue here, it was of the first importance that Athens with her powerful fleet should be preferably his friend and ally, or at worst too weak and preoccupied to help Persia. In 346 he had obtained an alliance with Athens,<sup>1</sup> but the anti-Macedonians there remained too strong for him to trust Athens. In 344 he tried once more to win Athens over by rather vague offers made in his name by Python.<sup>2</sup> These offers may well have led Athens to give a cold answer to the contemporary appeal for aid from Artaxerxes.<sup>3</sup> But the anti-Macedonians seized the opportunity created by the hopes Python evoked to induce Athens to ask for more than Philip could give. The settlement of 346 was to be revised so that each should have his own, and therefore that Amphipolis should be restored to Athens.<sup>4</sup> They knew that Philip would not agree,<sup>5</sup> and they intended the negotiations to fail. In their view, and they were surely right, if Athens accepted favours from Philip, she would become his vassal; others who did not see this had to be convinced that all hopes reposed in Philip were fallacious, that Philip was not to be trusted. The failure of Hegesippus' mission to Philip produced a growing acerbity in the relations of Athens and Macedon.<sup>6</sup> In Elis his intrigues and subsidies may have contributed to an anti-democratic revolution.<sup>7</sup> In 343 or 342 we find Philip trying to establish his partisans in power at Megara; he was frustrated by their opponents, perhaps with help from Athens.<sup>8</sup> In early 342 he was thought to be menacing Ambracia; Athens reacted with arms and diplomacy (p. 257). Even Philip's friends in the Peloponnese were silenced or began to feel misgivings; and Demosthenes was able to negotiate alliances with them, which did not in the end bring them into an anti-Macedonian coalition but at least kept them neutral.<sup>9</sup> But until

<sup>1</sup> D. 19. 40 shows that it was Philip who asked for alliance.

<sup>2</sup> D. 7. 18 ff. In defiance of the evidence Cawkwell makes the proposal for a *koine eirene* emanate from Philip.

<sup>3</sup> Cawkwell, ii. 121 ff., convincingly argues that the Persian envoys and Python appeared at Athens at the same time; I feel less certainty that the date is summer 344 (cf. p. 256 nn. 3-5 with text for Jacoby's doctrine on which he relies); and I am sure that the second *Philippic* was delivered on an earlier occasion (perhaps, *contra* Dionysius, in 345/4), 'as D. says not a word of Persia, and in the Hypothesis too there is no reference to a Persian embassy' (Beloch iii. 22. 290, who mistakenly inferred that the speech was made later).

<sup>4</sup> D. 7. 26 f.

<sup>5</sup> D. 6. 17.

<sup>6</sup> D. 19. 331.

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>8</sup> D. 19. 260; 294; 9. 27; 18. 295; Diod. 16. 63; Paus. 4. 28. 5; 5. 4. 9 (Philip's subsidies); Plut., see p. 259 n. 3. The facts are obscure. There is no mention of Macedonian mercenaries.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 257 n. 5. Cawkwell's suggestion (ii. 205 n. 9) that Messene, etc., made alliance with Athens 'probably out of fear of Sparta, not of Philip' is implausible; it contravenes the natural sense of the scholiast, implies that Demosthenes was ready to offer help against Sparta, when he was bent on devoting all Athens' resources to the struggle with Philip, and neglects the probability that the Spartan danger had evaporated with king Archidamus' departure for Italy, which followed the *stasis* in Elis (Beloch iii. 12. 595 n. 1). With no fear of Sparta, Argos and Messene were again ready to join in action against Macedon in 323 (Diod. 18. 11).

342 Philip did not actually bring about a revolution in any city by force, and his army had not attacked any of the Greeks. His interventions in Euboea were flagrant. Strategically, they were sound; from bases in Eretria and Oreus he could threaten Attica and Athenian shipping.<sup>1</sup> But oddly enough, Philip's forces do not seem to have remained in Euboea; neither Cephisophon nor Phocion had to contend with his mercenaries. If not preoccupied by difficulties in Thrace, Philip may have assumed that his Euboean friends could stand without his support. And politically, his actions were disastrous. They inspired widespread distrust in the cities of old Greece, of the islands, and of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, and Demosthenes and his friends could build up coalitions which baffled Philip in the straits and at least contested his military superiority by land in 339-8.<sup>2</sup>

As in 378, Athens could best secure allies, if it appeared that her own aims were not purely egotistical. Demosthenes grasped the significance of the Euboean aspirations for independence manifested in 357, 349/8, and 341. He was ready to abandon the claim that the Euboeans must re-enter the league Athens controlled in return for genuine co-operation in what he saw as a life-and-death struggle with Philip. So too in 339 when negotiating an alliance with Thebes, he could forget Oropus and Plataea, pledge Athens to support Theban dominance in Boeotia, concede to Thebes the command by land and a share in the command by sea, and accept for Athens the heavier financial burden of the war. Aeschines said that it was not Demosthenes but the crisis that secured the Theban alliance.<sup>3</sup> That was untrue; Thebes stood in greater danger from war than Athens, which could neither be taken by assault nor be starved out, and Thebes could have had favourable terms from Philip; many Thebans were ready to accept them.<sup>4</sup> Disregarding the circumstances in which Demosthenes negotiated the Euboean and Theban alliances, Aeschines criticized him for neglecting interests for which Athens had striven long. It might be doubted if the criticisms, wrong-headed as they were, represented his true mind. Did the *proxenus* of Clitarchus and Philistides (p. 253 n. 3) really care himself about Athenian supremacy in Euboea? Or was it his wish, which he did not dare to avow, simply that Athens should stand well with Philip? Even in retrospect, he could only denigrate Demosthenes, not propose an alternative policy.

Chaeronea was ruinous for Callias as well as for Athens. Like so many other anti-Macedonians, he had to take refuge in Athens; it was probably now that he and his brother received Athenian citizenship, an honour that would have been compromising to the champions of Euboean freedom, if it

<sup>1</sup> Cawkwell ii. 212 n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> The allies at Chaeronea included Achaeans (Paus. 7. 6. 5; cf. Cawkwell ii. 205 n. 9), Acarnanians (Tod 178), Corinthians (Strabo 9. 2. 37), Phocians (Paus. 10. 3. 3), Locrians of Amphissa (Ps.-Plut. 851B; cf. Wüst 160; 163 n. 1), Euboeans, and perhaps Megarians; if D. 18. 237 (list of allies) relates to those who supplied troops in 338, we may add Leucadians and Corcyraeans and note that the list is incomplete, omitting Acarnanians, Phocians, and Locrians. We have only Aeschines'

word (2. 97) that Demosthenes ever boasted that *all* the Peloponnesians would fight Philip. The absence of the Arcadians associated with Mantinea and of Phlius may, however, have disappointed him. Whether or not the conference convened for Anthesterion 340 met, he had obtained substantial successes by his diplomacy.

<sup>3</sup> A. 2. 132 ff., esp. 141-5; cf. 106. In 133 A. suggests that the Theban decision was wrong; he has it both ways!

<sup>4</sup> D. 18. 213; cf. Philoch. F. 56; Theop. ap. Plut. *Dem.* 18.

had been accepted earlier.<sup>1</sup> Chalcis, like Athens itself, was given some territory torn from Thebes;<sup>2</sup> but probably Philip installed a garrison there;<sup>3</sup> these measures may explain why the Euboeans, except Carystus, fought for Macedon in the Lamian war.<sup>4</sup> The Euboean league must surely have been dissolved. It was to revive in the Hellenistic age,<sup>5</sup> but by then freedom of the old style was unattainable.

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## APPENDIX

### *Philip and Megara*

In autumn 343 Demosthenes accused Philip of plotting against Megara (19. 204 and 326) and implied that his plot had recently miscarried (ibid. 334); in more detail he tells that the philippizers there were men of rank, who thought that they should have more power than the many and boasted of being Philip's guest-friends and that Ptoiodorus, the first of the Megarians in wealth, birth, and reputation (cf. Plut. *Dion* 17), had first begged off Perillus, when he was prosecuted, rather mysteriously, after a visit to Philip and then sent him off again to Macedon; he returned with a band of mercenaries, while Ptoiodorus intrigued at home (19. 294 f.). It is clear that the *coup* attempted by Ptoiodorus and Perillus had failed before he published the speech *On the False Embassy*. In the fourth *Philippic* (9) Demosthenes sets Philip's near-seizure of Megara after his razing of the fort at Porthmus (cf. p. 251) and establishment of a tyranny in Euboea (presumably at Eretria) but before his coup at Oreus, but since no tyranny had been established in Euboea by the autumn of 343, and Philip's 'plot' against Megara had then already failed, it looks as if this text is chronologically unreliable. (18. 71 is plainly in no chronological order.) It is more puzzling that he also suggests here that Athens took no action. Plutarch tells how in response to a Megarian appeal for help Phocion persuaded the Athenians to march at once to Megara, thus anticipating assistance the Boeotians might have given, and connected Megara by long walls with Nisaea, which he fortified (*Phoc.* 15). Plutarch does not say from what quarter danger was apprehended, but it was evidently not from Boeotia, since the Boeotians were looked on as possible protectors of Megara. He tells the story after recounting Phocion's operations in the Hellespont against Philip in 340, but we cannot be sure, in view of his indifference to chronology, that he even means that the Megarian episode came later. It is tempting to place it in 343 and to suppose that it was Phocion's intervention that saved Megara from

<sup>1</sup> A. 3. 85; 87; Hyper. *contra Dem.* 20 (echoing A.'s unfair gibe in 3. 90 *πλείους τραπεζόμενος τροπὰς τοῦ Εὐρίπου*); Dinarch. 1. 44. Other refugees, Tod 166; 173; 178; A. 3. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo 9. 2. 8; 10. 1. 8; cf. Schäfer iii. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Garrisons (cf. generally Diod. 18. 10. 2) are attested in Thebes (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 7. 1), Ambracia (Diod. 17. 3. 3), and Corinth (Plut. *Arat.* 23); even if Strabo's report that Philip called Chalcis and Corinth the

fetters of Greece (9. 4. 15) refers or should refer to Philip V (cf. Polyb. 18. 11), it seems intrinsically likely that Chalcis was garrisoned then, as later (Diod. 19. 77. 4, 312/11), by Macedon, especially as it was permitted to block passage through the Euripus (last note) and was a naval base under Alexander (Arr. 2. 2. 4).

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 18. 11. 2; Paus. 1. 25. 4; Hyper. *Epit.* 11.

<sup>5</sup> *IG* xii. 9. 207.

Perillus and his mercenaries. It is no objection that Phocion was the commander, as he did take command in anti-Macedonian expeditions, even though politically he came to favour an understanding with Philip; however, if Plutarch is right, on this occasion Phocion actually inspired the expedition, and that is less to be expected, if its purpose was to thwart Philip, though Eubulus too moved anti-Macedonian decrees (D. 18. 75). Moreover, it is odd that Demosthenes made no reference to an Athenian intervention, if it was so decisive, in his speech of 343 and that he expressly says in 341 that Athens had neglected any action when Megara was in peril. The possibility then exists that Phocion's expedition should be dated to 340 or 339 and that its occasion is totally unknown. Be this as it may, it is certain that by spring 341 Megara was hostile to Philip, like Chalcis, for Demosthenes could ridicule the notion that these petty cities could save Greece if the Athenians ran away from their duty (3. 74), and that Megara joined Demosthenes' anti-Macedonian coalition (Aesch. 3. 95; Dem. 18. 237); Megarians helped to free Oreus (p. 255 n. 4) and may have fought at Chaeronea, though that is not recorded. When we consider that the Megarians had in the recent past enriched themselves by long neutrality (Isocr. 8. 113), and that they had been at enmity with Athens as lately as 350/49 (p. 250 n. 3), or later (D. 18. 234), it is hard to avoid the conclusion, though Cawkwell doubts it (*C.Q.* xiii (1963), 203), that it was not a figment of Demosthenes' propaganda that Philip had stood behind Perillus: the Megarians themselves must have believed it, for they can have had no quarrel with Philip, unless he had appeared to be directly threatening their own city, and they had little reason to love Athens. Cawkwell's doubts arise from Plutarch's failure to connect Phocion's expedition with Philip, on which see above, and from the silence of Hegesippus (cf. p. 252). Perhaps we should infer that Hegesippus contented himself with cataloguing Philip's direct interventions with his own troops; how far Philip was inculpated in Perillus' *coup* may have been disputable when he spoke, and he may not have wished to invoke instances of his aggressions that were not plainly demonstrable. On the whole, Hegesippus' silence on Megara is rather an argument for questioning whether it proves that Philip had not yet intervened in Euboea than for maintaining that he had not sought to bring about a revolution in Megara.